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Abstract
We propose a model where imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers on local
labor markets leads to spatial agglomeration. We show that the occurrence of spatial
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ﬁrms. We analyse the eﬀect of diﬀerent public policies. In our setting, the eﬀect of a
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11 Introduction
In economic geography, there are several reasons why workers and ﬁrms agglomerate in a few
areas. Most models have explored the agglomeration process based on the home-market eﬀect
(Krugman, 1991b), speciﬁc non-tradable inputs (Venables, 1996) or technological spillovers
(Belleﬂamme et al., 2000). According to Marshall (1920), the way local labor markets operate
is yet another reason why spatial polarization of both workers and ﬁrms of an industry will
persist. He states:
“A localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it oﬀers a constant
market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to ﬁnd
a good choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking
employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need such skills
as theirs and where therefore it is likely to ﬁnd a good market”.
Such an explanation of industrial concentration is supported by empirical evidence. Dumais
et al. (1997) shows that industrial spatial polarization persistence is driven mostly by labor
pooling. Three theoretical arguments can be provided in order to explain Marshall’s intuition:
risk, “hold-up”, and skill mismatch. As explained in Krugman (1991a), workers locate where
there is the largest number of ﬁrms in order to minimize the risk of being unemployed and ﬁrms
choose to locate where there is a large pool of workers. This argument has been developed
in Picard and Toulemonde (2001). In Rotemberg and Saloner (2000), ﬁrms are induced to
agglomerate in a region, and thereby face tough competition on the labor market, so as to
commit not to hold-up workers’ speciﬁc human capital. Therefore, workers have incentives
to invest in human capital where ﬁrms are agglomerated. In this paper, we explore a third
argument, namely skill mismatch.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a very simple setting in which imperfect
matching between ﬁrms and workers explains spatial polarization of both workers and ﬁrms,
even in the presence of non-strategic behaviour of ﬁrms on the ﬁnal good market. Our modelling
of the labor market is related to Becker’s argument according to which a worker is characterized
both byhisspeciﬁc human capital (the task he perfectly matches) and his general human capital
which allows mobility between tasks. We argue that imperfect matching, even slight, between
2ﬁrms’ requirements and workers’ specializations is suﬃcient to explain spatial polarization.
Indeed, imperfect matching gives rise to imperfect competition on the labor market and thereby
confers oligopsonic power to ﬁrms.1 Therefore, workers have incentives to locate close to a large
number of ﬁrms since they do not want to be captured by a ﬁrm. But because of urban costs
workers prefer not too densely populated areas. Firms, on one hand, prefer to escape from tough
competition on the labor market but, on the other hand, want to be close to a large number
of workers. In that way, we identify, as in a typical economic geography model, centripetal
as well as centrifugal forces. We show that, if a region’s size in terms of number of workers
and ﬁr m si si n i t i a l l ys u ﬃciently large, agglomeration forces lead the economy toward complete
agglomeration. In terms of global welfare, we show that there is too much agglomeration. The
diﬀerence between equilibrium outcome and optimum is due to the imperfection on the labor
market which confers too much incentives to workers to agglomerate.
Second, we apply our framework to re-examine how public policies such as an improvement
of interregional mobility of workers, an increase in the level of human capital or a competition
policy, inﬂuence the degree of regional disparity. Indeed, workers’ low spatial mobility is
considered as a critical feature of the European Union. Furthermore, European regional policy
puts a heavy emphasis on training in order to reduce spatial disparities (see de la Fuente
and Vives, 1995). Moreover, competition policy is one of the leading economic policies at
the European level and its impact on regional inequalities is poorly examined. Our main
conclusions are the following. First, as in other economic geography models, the presence
of immobile workers in each region acts as a dispersion force: we show that the presence of
immobile workers can radically change the spatial outcome. Second, whereas the “brain drain”
literature stresses that newly skilled workers could be induced to leave depressed areas and
always locate in the most developed regions, we show that if an improvement in the level of
human capital leads to greater mobility of workers between tasks, an increase in human capital
reduces regional disparities. This result is in sharp contrast with existing models (Miyagiwa,
1991) in which an increase in human capital is likely to intensify the “brain drain”. If, on the
contrary, an increase in human capital leads to a greater specialisation of workers, we obtain
the same results as in the brain drain literature. Our result follows from the agglomeration
force at work in our setting. Indeed, Becker stresses that an increase in general human capital
1Such oligopsonic power is supported by empirical evidence, see i. e. Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs (1999).
3improves the mobility of workers between qualiﬁcations. Therefore, monopsony power decreases
and thereby hurts less workers who eventually have less incentives to migrate toward the larger
region. In other words, these ﬁrst two results state that whereas more spatial mobility is likely
to increase regional disparities, increasing skill mobility is likely to reduce such disparities.
Third, we show that a competition policy aimed at fostering entry of new ﬁrms on the market
reduces regional disparities.
There are a few papers related to the issue under consideration in this paper. In the
urban economics literature, there are two papers which use the same framework to look at
speciﬁc spatial equilibria. However, these papers do not look at the spatial dynamics and the
possibility of regional divergence as in the new economic geography literature. Hesley and
Strange (1990) show how the working of the labor market leads the economy to agglomerate
within symmetrical cities. Their modelling of the labor market diﬀers from ours in the sense
that the wage setting process involves Nash bargaining between ﬁrms and workers and does not
take into account the existence of rival ﬁrms. Another related paper is that of Abdel-Rahman
and Wang (1995). In a framework close to that of Hesley and Strange (1990), they look at
one spatial equilibrium which consists of a single metropolis within a system of cities and give
conditions on the parameters under which it exists. Rioux and Verdier (2000) look at the
incentives for local governments to ﬁnance general human capital. Here the main diﬀerence
is that workers are assumed to be immobile between regions while ﬁrms are mobile. Finally,
our analysis is reminiscent of the model by Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985). In their case,
agglomeration takes place because of competition on the product market.
Our framework shows also a strong similarity with the “brain drain” literature that explains
why skilled workers are induced to locate close to each other (Miyagiwa, 1991; Reichlin and
Rustichini, 1998 or B´ enabou, 1996 in an urban context). Nevertheless those papers assume
the existence of an exogenous positive local human capital externality whereas in this paper
we attempt to bring microeconomic foundations to such externalities. Yet the outcome is the
same: ceteris paribus, agglomeration of skilled workers increases their productivity. Such a
result receives large empirical support (Peri, 1998, for instance).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. We look
at the equilibrium in the labor market and derive the regional wages and proﬁts. Section 3
analyses location decisions of the agents. In section 4, we confront the migration decisions of
4the two types of agents and describe the diﬀerent spatial outcomes. In Section 5, we look at how
diﬀerent public policies can inﬂuence the spatial outcome. And ﬁnally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Workers and ﬁrms
There are two regions, region A and region B. In each region, there are both workers and
ﬁrms. We denote by αA (respectively αB =1− αA) the share of the population of workers
l o c a t e di nr e g i o nA (respectively in region B). The population of each region consists of mobile
and immobile workers. We assume that the total population is equal to 1. Both mobile and
immobile workers are endowed with the same level of human capital h. This human capital
determines a worker’s productivity.
There are N ﬁrms. The total number of ﬁrms is exogenous. Nevertheless, in Section 5, we
discuss the impact of a variation of N.W ed e n o t eb yβA the share of ﬁrms located in region
A. We consider N suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs oa st ob ea b l et oi g n o r et h ei n t e g e rp r o b l e m .E a c hﬁrm
incurs a ﬁxed cost (which is not speciﬁe dh e r es i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms is
exogenous) and produces a homogenous good with labor according to the following technology:
Y = F(hl)( 1 )
with F0 > 0a n dF00 ≤ 0. We denote by l the number of workers. Such a technology exhibits
non-increasing returns to scale with respect to labor. Since our objective is to focus on the im-
pact of matching in the labor market, we assume that all ﬁrms produce the same homogeneous
good and are price takers on the good market. Furthermore, trade between the two regional
goods markets is assumed to be costless which means that the price of the homogenous good
is the same in both regions. We normalize the product price to one. This assumption implies
that all interaction eﬀects on the goods market are ruled out and that, unlike in Krugman
(1991b) and Ottaviano et al. (2002), they do not inﬂuence the location decisions of agents.
In equilibrium, ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts. We assume that all workers have an equal share of
total proﬁts.
Each region is a linear segment along which the population of workers is uniformly dis-
tributed. There is a central business district (CBD) where ﬁrms are located and where pro-
5duction takes place.2 Workers reside outside the city and commute to the CBD to work. Each
worker consumes one unit of land and his commuting cost is linear in the distance travelled. The
u r b a nc o s t si n c u r r e db yt h ew o r k e r sc o n s i s to fb o t hl a n dr e n ta sw e l la sc o m m u t i n gc o s t .W e
assume that the land rents collected are equally distributed among the workers. Under these






where t>0 is the unit commuting cost paid in the num´ eraire good and which is identical to
both regions.3
Both ﬁrms and (mobile) workers choose their spatial location. Firms choose their location
in function of the proﬁt they earn and workers base their decision on the income which is the
s u mo ft h e i rw a g ea n dt h es h a r eo fp r o ﬁt they obtain. Contrary to other economic geography
models, in our framework, we do not assume that ﬁrms adjust instantaneously and thereby
allow for a richer set of dynamics.
2.2 The labor market
Firms and workers are located in one region only and the labor market is local. Workers have
heterogenous skills while ﬁrms are characterized by a particular technology.4 Since there is only
a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms present in the labor market, there is a certain mismatch between the
skills of the workers and the requirements of the ﬁrms. To model this we use the framework of
Hamilton et al. (2000). The labor market is described by a circle of circumference one, which
stands for the skill space. Each position on the circle indicates a specialization. Each ﬁrm
and each worker has a speciﬁc position on the circle. For the worker, it represents the skills
he possesses and for the ﬁrm it represents the skill requirement of its technology. A worker
can produce output only when his skills perfectly match the ﬁrm’s technology. If his skills
do not match any existing technology, then the worker has to undergo training. The training
2See Fujita and Thisse (1996) for reasons why ﬁrms want to locate in the CBD.
3See Appendix.
4As shown by Stevens (1994) ﬁrms have an incentive to diﬀerentiate their skill requirements in order to
obtain market power in the labour market characterised by the heterogeneity of the workers’ skills.
6cost depends on the distance between the worker’s skill and the ﬁrm’s skill requirement. More
speciﬁcally, if the position of worker is given by x a n dt h a to ft h eﬁrm by xi, then the training
cost function is given by s(h)|x − xi|. The unit cost of this training is given by s(h). The unit
cost of training can depend on h in two diﬀerent ways. A negative relationship between the
two means that, as explained in Becker (1964), (general) human capital improves the ability of
workers to match a given technology.5 If, on the contrary, the unit cost of training is positively
related to h, an increase in human capital represents an increase in the worker’ specialisation.6
We assume that there is asymmetric information between workers and ﬁrms. First, ﬁrms are
not able to observe workers’ positions on the circle. The only information they have is about the
distribution of workers in the skill space. We assume that workers are uniformly distributed on
the circle. Consequently, the ﬁrms set wages that do not depend on the workers’ characteristics.
Similarly, workers do not observe the ﬁrms’ positions before choosing the region where they
will be working. The workers only know the number of ﬁrms in a particular region and form an
expectation concerning the distance to the nearest ﬁrm. This amounts to assume that workers
migrate before they ﬁnd a job. Because of the assumption on asymmetric information between
ﬁrms and workers, we consider here that workers have to bear all the training costs.
Hence the timing of the game is the following. In a ﬁrst stage, mobile workers and ﬁrms
choose simultaneously their region. In a second stage, ﬁrms compete on the local labor markets.
Solving the game by backward induction, we ﬁrst focus on the wage setting process and then
study the migration decisions and the spatial equilibria.
2.3 Regional wages and proﬁts
Since interaction on the labor market is local, regional wages and proﬁts depend on the char-
acteristics of each region. Each region is characterized by the size of its labor market, reﬂected
by its population density and the number of ﬁrms. Wages are set by the ﬁrms in order to max-
imise their proﬁts. Workers base their location decisions on the expected wage. This expected
wage depends on the gross wage oﬀered by the ﬁrms and the expected training cost. Finally,
ﬁrms infer the proﬁt they will obtain in each region based on the population and the number
5This is the assumption made in Hamilton et al. (2000).
6While throughout the paper we talk about “training costs”, it can represent any type of cost as, for instance,
a loss of utility associated to the mismatch.
7of ﬁrms in that region.
Consider a ﬁrm i in region j (j = A,B) located in the skill space at xi. The labor supply
to ﬁrm i depends on the wage it proposes as well as on the wages wi−1 and wi+1 set by the
adjacent ﬁrms. Denote by b x and b y respectively the workers indiﬀerent to working in ﬁrm i or
ﬁrm i − 1a n dﬁrm i and i + 1. This implies that the labor supply to ﬁrm i is given by:7













Hence the proﬁt is given by (for ease of notation we use li for li (wi,w i−1,w i+1))
πi = F (hli) − wili (4)














This expression gives the eﬀect of a change in the ﬁrm’s own wage on its labor supply. The
higher the population density, the smaller the wage increase needed to increase the labor supply
to the ﬁrm. We focus here on the symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is an equilibrium where
ﬁrms are equidistant9 and where wi = w. Given that the ﬁrms are symmetrically located on













7For a proof see appendix. Note that we assume that no worker stays unemployed. This is the case when
the wage is positive for any worker. A suﬃcient condition for this to be true is that the marginal productivity is
high enough. This assumption allows us to focus on skill mismatch as a determinant of spatial agglomeration.
8It is readily veriﬁed that the SOC is always veriﬁed.
9Following Economides (1989) and Kats (1995), the equidistant conﬁguration of locations on the circle is
likely to be an equilibrium outcome of a game in which ﬁrms choose their technologies prior to setting their
wages. In our case, this has to be considered as an approximation. Allowing for asymmetric ﬁrm locations
would only complicate computations without modifying the results.








































< 0( 7 )
The expression for the wage equals the marginal productivity of labor (the wage that would
prevail with perfect competition on the labor market) minus a term s/βAN which can be in-
terpreted as the impact of imperfect competition on the labor market. In this model, imperfect
competition results from imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers. Firms beneﬁtf r o m
such an imperfection: they can set a wage lower than the marginal productivity by using the
fact that a worker cannot move to another ﬁrm at zero cost. Therefore, the higher the unit
training cost s, the greater the monopsony power of the ﬁrm and the lower its wage. However,
this monopsony power is reduced by the number of ﬁrms in the region. This eﬀect is captured
by the fact that the wage is positively related to the number of ﬁrms in the region. In our case,
this eﬀect arises because a change in the number of ﬁrms in a region changes the intensity of
competition between ﬁr m s ,w h i c hi nt u r ni n ﬂuences the equilibrium wage. Note that the wage
is also positively related to the number of ﬁrms through the impact of the number of ﬁrms
on the marginal productivity. Finally, expression (5) shows that an increase in the density
of workers pushes wages down. As the density of workers increases, the number of workers
a ﬁrm employs increases and the marginal productivity decreases. Such an impact is due to
diminishing returns.
Moreover, consider a worker not yet located in a region. This worker only knows the number
of ﬁrms located in that region but, beforehand, he does not know exactly the distance to the
ﬁrm where he will be employed. If he expects ﬁrms to be symmetrically located on the circle,
9his expected wage is the gross wage net of expected training cost E(TC) and is given by:
wA (αA,βA)=wA (αA,βA) − E(TC)














Here again, the expected wage increases as the number of ﬁrms within the region increases.
However, here the eﬀect of βA is stronger than it is for the worker who perfectly matches the
skill needs of a ﬁrm since it also takes into account the eﬀect on the training costs that the
workers incur.
Using equations (4) and (5), the equilibrium proﬁti sg i v e nb y
























Proﬁts depend negatively on the number of ﬁrms located in the region since competition on
the labor market gets ﬁercer. The density of the labor market has a positive impact on proﬁt.
The explanation is twofold. First, the wage decreases as αA increases because of the decreasing
returns to scale. Second, ceteris paribus, the number of workers employed becomes higher.
3 Migration decisions
The previous section describes wages and proﬁts for given agents’ locations. However, since
ﬁrms and workers can move from one region to another (for now, we assume that all workers
are mobile), these locations are endogenous. We start looking at the location decisions and the
location dynamics for each agent separately and then confront the behaviour of the two types
of agents to obtain the regional location dynamics.
103.1 Firms
The comparison between the proﬁt obtained in region A and the proﬁt obtained in region B
leads to the following expression:
∆π (αA,βA)=πA (αA,βA) − πB (αB,βB)
Furthermore, since we assume10
αB =1− αA and βB =1− βA
we have
∆π (αA,βA)=πA (αA,βA) − πB (1 − αA,1 − βA) (12)
It follows from (10) and (11) that:
∂∆π
∂βA




More agglomeration of ﬁrms within region A reduces the diﬀerence of proﬁt while agglomeration
of workers in region A magniﬁes this diﬀerence. In other words, competition on the labor market
is a centrifugal force whereas the size of the labor force is a centripetal force.
In equilibrium, we know that (12) is zero, which holds if and only if
βA = M(αA)
Function M gives for any density of workers αA,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms in region A (βA)s u c ht h a t
proﬁts in both regions are the same: the agglomeration force and the dispersion force oﬀset
each other. This means that we have a one-to-one relationship between the number of ﬁrms
in a region and the population of workers in that region. Moreover, unlike existing economic
geography models (e.g. Krugman, 1991b; Ottaviano et al., 2002) where this link is exogenously








10While the assumption that the total population is constant seems natural, the assumption that the total
number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed is likely to have important implications. Section 5.3 looks at the eﬀect of a change in
N.
11Moreover we prove in the appendix that M
00
(αA) > 0.
Graphically, this gives us the following result
Figure 1
The ﬁgure represents the function M: on the X-axis, the labor force αA of region A is
represented and on the Y-axis the share of ﬁrms in region A is represented. The curve in Figure
1 is symmetric with respect to point (1/2,1/2). In addition, the function M is increasing in αA.
T h er e a s o ni so b v i o u s :a st h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r si nr e g i o nA increases, the proﬁtd i ﬀerence
increases. Therefore, the number of ﬁrms in region A must rise to oﬀs e ts u c ha ni n c r e a s e .
Moreover, note that below the curve, that is if the number of ﬁrms located in region A is
relatively low compared with the density of workers, the proﬁti nr e g i o nA is higher than in
region B. Indeed, competition on the labor market is relatively low compared with the density
of the labor market: the dispersion force oﬀsets the agglomeration force. Therefore, ﬁrms have
an incentive to move from region B to region A.
123.2 Workers
In deciding where he wants to locate, a worker compares the net expected income in each
region as well as the diﬀerence in cost of locating in each region.11 Since the share of proﬁt
a worker obtains is independent of his location, he will base his location decision on the wage
diﬀerence. More precisely, the worker looks at the diﬀerence of expected wages. The reason
for considering the expected wage is that before making his decision the worker only knows
the number of ﬁrms in a particular region. He forms an expectation about the distance to the
nearest ﬁrm.
The diﬀerence between the net expected wage obtained in region A and the net expected
salary obtained in region B and the cost diﬀerence gives us the following expression:









From this and from (7) and (6), we have that
∂∆w
∂βA




As ﬁrms’ agglomeration in region A increases, the wage diﬀerence increases as well: tough
competition on the labor market is a centripetal force for workers.S t a t e dd i ﬀerently, imperfect
matching on the labor market confers bargaining power on ﬁrms and leads workers to move to
the region where a larger number of ﬁrms are located. This is in contrast with “brain drain”
models (Miyagiwa, 1991) where the number of skilled workers is an agglomeration force because
of exogenous human capital externalities. Moreover, the wage diﬀerence decreases as the mass
of workers in region A rises: the mass of workers within one region is a dispersion force. This
force consists of two eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect operates through the decreasing returns in the
production function and the second eﬀect is the urban cost eﬀect.
We have that the diﬀerence in net expected wages is zero if
NA = G(αA)
11There is empirical evidence that besides diﬀerences in wages, diﬀerences in housing costs play an important
role in migration decisions, both in the US (Haurin and Haurin 1991) and in several European countries
(Tassinopoulos 1998). See also Hall (1990) on the attractiveness of regions and Dieleman and Jobse (1997) on









Graphically, this gives us the following result.
Figure 2
Function G gives for a mass of workers in region A (αA)t h en u m b e ro fﬁrms that equalize
net expected wages in both regions. Above line G, workers enjoy a higher wage in region A
than in region B:t h e l a r g e n u m b e r o f ﬁr m sc o m p a r e dt ot h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r si m p l i e sa
strong competition on the labor market. Consider a young worker that does not work yet and
has to choose his spatial location. He observes only the number of ﬁrms located in region A
or in region B. Thus, this worker compares net expected wages in both regions. Therefore,
whenever the economy is above the curve G, he has an incentive to locate in region A.N o t e
that when t increases, the curve G rotates counterclockwise: a higher t for the same number
of workers needs to be compensated by a higher wage. This will be the case if the matching is
improved through a larger number of ﬁrms.
144 Spatial equilibria
The migration decisions of workers and ﬁrms are a priori independent of one another. Thus,
in order to get the spatial distribution of economic activity, we must deal with both migration
decisions. Confronting the location decisions of the two agents leads us to the following result
(the diﬀerent ﬁgures are drawn for a quadratic production function and for t>t ,s e ea p p e n d i x
7.5).
Figure 3
There exist at most three types of equilibria (see appendix 7.5 for the existence):
• Spatial equilibria characterized by an “asymmetric-interior” distribution of both ﬁrms
and workers at point I and I0. Firms and workers are agglomerated within one region
but, such agglomeration is not complete: workers and ﬁrms remain located in the other
region. We show in appendix (7.5) that points I and I0 exist. We should notice that
there could exist more than two “asymmetric interior” equilibria.
15• Two equilibria characterized by full agglomeration of mobile workers in either region A
or region B (point F or F0).
• A symmetric equilibrium where half of workers as well as half of ﬁrms locate in both
regions (point S).
The spatial outcome will depend both on the initial conditions of the region as well as the
speed of adjustment of both types of agents. We analyse three cases. In the ﬁrst case, we
assume that ﬁrms adjust themselves instantaneously while workers’ adjustment is imperfect.
The second case looks at the mirror situation where workers adjust themselves immediately
while the mobility of ﬁrms is lower. Finally, we look at the case where the adjustment speeds
for both agents are ﬁnite.
1. The speed of adjustment of ﬁrms is inﬁnite. The whole dynamic is described along the
M curve. The dynamics of the workers is given by:
˙ αA =

   
   
ϕMax(∆w(αA,βA),0) if αA =0
ϕ∆w(αA,βA)i f0 < αA < 1
ϕMin(∆w(αA,βA),0) if αA =1
(14)
with ϕ > 0.
Note that as in Ottaviano et al. (2002), we consider only myopic agents since the migra-
tion decision is driven by the current wage only.
According to equation (14), new workers have an incentive to locate in region A whenever
the net expected wage wA is higher than the net expected wage in region B.I nt h es a m e
16way, the ﬁrm locate in region A whenever the proﬁt is higher in region A.
Figure 4
As a result, whenever the density of workers is less than ¯ α, the economy converges toward
the symmetric equilibrium while whenever this density of workers in region A is higher
than ¯ α, the economy converges toward complete agglomeration. In other words, ¯ α is a
threshold value for the size of region A above which this region is able to attract new
workers and thereby new ﬁrms. The population level ¯ α is the critical size above which
a cumulative process leads the economy toward complete agglomeration of ﬁrms and
workers.




   
   
γMax(∆π(αA,βA),0) if βA =0
γ∆π (αA,βA)i f0 < βA < 1
γMin(∆π (αA,βA),0) if βA =1
(15)
17where γ > 0.
Figure 5
As it is clear from Figure 5, the stable equilibria remain the same. Here again we ﬁnd a
size eﬀect. But in this case, the size threshold is expressed in terms of a critical number of
ﬁrms ¯ β.I fac o u n t r yi ss u ﬃciently large in terms of number of ﬁrms, it attracts workers
which then attract more ﬁrms and so on.
183. The adjustment speeds of both agents are ﬁnite.
Figure 6
The dynamics of workers and ﬁrms are given by equations (14) and (15). Point I and I0
are a saddle point (see appendix 7.6).
In this case, the initial conditions, both in terms of population and number of ﬁrms,
as well as the diﬀerence of the speed of adjustment of both types of agents, determine
the spatial outcome. Consider point J in Figure 6. Since this point is at the right of ¯ α
the economy would be completely agglomerated if the speed of adjustment of the ﬁrms
were inﬁnite. But since, in this case, there is some inertia in their location decisions,
the combined dynamics lead the economy to a completely diﬀerent outcome, namely the
symmetrical equilibrium. The explanation is the following. At point J,t h ew o r k e r s
of region A have an incentive to move to region B because the number of ﬁrms is not
suﬃciently large. At the same time, there is an entry of ﬁrms in region A because the
number of workers there is large. Depending on whether or not the speed of adjustment
of the ﬁr m si ss u ﬃciently important, a threshold is going to be reached where the mass
of ﬁrms in region A is important enough to attract again workers to region A.I f n o t ,
19then, on the contrary, another threshold is going to be reached in terms of population
such that ﬁrms no longer want to move into region A.
Starting from J, a country like the US might end up in point S while in the EU might
reach point F. This can be explained in the following way. The critical size threshold
above which the region converges to full agglomeration depends on the population and the
number of ﬁrms. However, the relative importance of these two elements in determining
the threshold is a function of the speeds of adjustment: at given adjustment speed of
the workers, the greater the speed of adjustment of the ﬁrms, the less important is the
number of ﬁrms. Point J for a country like the US where the mobility of workers is high
m i g h tn o tb ei nt h eb a s s i no fa t t r a c t i o no fp o i n tF and thus end up in point S while for
the EU, where typically the workers are less mobile (Bentivogli and Pagano, 1999), this
point might, on the contrary, may be in the bassin of attraction of point F.
The spatial equilibria are the result of the existence of a threshold eﬀect: above a certain
initial size asymmetry between regions (α or β in the polar cases), a self-reinforcing process
leads ﬁrms and workers to agglomerate within one region. Therefore, the impact of any public
policy depends on its eﬀect on the threshold. In other words, a public intervention that increases
the threshold value is likely to push the economy toward less regional agglomeration since such
a policy increases the size above which the economy converges toward complete agglomeration.
5 Public policies and regional outcome
We focus on three diﬀerent public policies: policies aimed at increasing workers’ spatial mobil-
ity, education policy and competition policy. We focus on these three public policies for two
main reasons. First, they make up the core of the European Commission public intervention.
Indeed, for instance, a recent report stresses that the Commission considers spatial mobility
as a crucial element so as to foster regional cohesion (Le Monde, 26th February 2002 on the
recent “Action plan for mobility” set up by the European Commission in March 2002). More-
over, similar proportions of Structural Funds, the main instrument of EU regional policy, are
devoted to education, infrastructure investment and subsidies to entreprises. Second, from a
theoretical point of view, we have shown in our model that worker mobility determines the
20spatial outcome. There are diﬀerent ways in which worker mobility can be deﬁned: workers
can be mobile between or within regions or they can be mobile in the labor market. And these
three public policies, directly or indirectly, have an impact on worker mobility.
So as to assess the impact of public policy in terms of global eﬃciency, we ﬁrst compare
both stable equilibria. For technical convenience, we consider hereafter a linear production
function: F(hl)=hl. In other words, we abstract from any scale eﬀect in production which
means that it is not a source of dispersion and thereby allows us to focus on the urban cost
and skill mismatch eﬀect. Note that our general results do not depend on whether we assume
constant or decreasing returns to scale.
5.1 Spatial outcome and eﬃciency
Total welfare is measured by taking the region’s total production and deducting the total











Total welfare of both regions is given by
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Recall that the training cost is not a transfer but a pure loss. Whether the economy is symmetric
or agglomerated, the total production (TP) remains the same while the training costs will be
lower in the agglomerated case because of a better labor market matching. In the case of the
21symmetrical equilibrium, we have αA =1 /2a n dw eh a v e






For the agglomerated outcome, we have




This means that socially the agglomerated equilibrium dominates the symmetrical equilibrium




We know that s/2N<twhich means that whenever there is imperfection on the labor market
(s>0), for high values of the urban cost (t>t ) the economy runs the risk of converging to
the suboptimal social equilibrium. In other words, when the urban cost is important, there
could be too much agglomeration. Such an ineﬃciency is due to imperfect competition on the
labor market. Indeed, the oligopsonic market power of ﬁrms on the labor market introduces
ad i ﬀerence between the private and social beneﬁt of agglomerating, the former being higher
than the latter since workers are induced to avoid market power by migrating toward the region
where most of the ﬁrms are located. As a corollary, any policy that leads the economy toward
dispersion is likely to be beneﬁcial.
5.2 Workers’ spatial mobility
Until now the assumption was that all workers are mobile. However, there are a number of
regions where immobile workers constitute an important share of the population. This leads
us to the following question: what happens when in each region a number of workers are
immobile? In terms of public policy implications, the question is whether and when a public
intervention aimed at increasing the workers’s mobility (i.e. increase the number of mobile
workers) will inﬂuence the regional distribution of economic activity.
Assume that a share of the total population is immobile and will not migrate even if there
is a wage diﬀerential. The regional distribution of immobile workers can be symmetric or
asymmetric. The skills’ space of the immobile workers is the same as the one of mobile workers
22and wages are set in exactly the same way. Since all workers have exactly the same level of
human capital and since, by assumption, both types of workers are perfect substitutes, within
each region both types of workers earn exactly the same wage. In the presence of immobile
workers, there is an upper and a lower bound on the population of region A, αA.T h el o w e r
bound is given by αi
A which is the number of immobile workers in region A. The upper bound is
given by 1−αi
B where αi
B are the immobile workers in region B. The thresholds, depending on
their positions can modify the location dynamics and change the spatial outcome. When there
are immobile workers in one region, the full agglomeration equilibrium in the other region is
obviously ruled out. The symmetrical equilibrium can also disappear if one of the two regions
has a share of immobile workers which is more than half of the total population.
Figure 7
The more important aspect of the presence of immobile workers is the fact that their
presence can change the spatial outcome in a fundamental way. Consider point K in Figure
7. When there are no immobile workers in region B, the dynamics would lead the economy to
the full agglomeration equilibrium. If there is a suﬃciently large number of immobile workers
in region B such that the upper boundary is to the left of ¯ α, then the economy no longer
fully agglomerates but converges either to the symmetrical equilibrium or the lower boundary.
23The equilibrium on the lower boundary can be shown to be stable.12 The reason is that the
movement of workers towards region A is unable to reach a suﬃciently high population level
necessary to attract the ﬁrms back to region A. This means that although initially region A is
large, the presence of immobile workers does not allow the region to reach the critical size in
terms of mass of workers to avoid ﬁrms leaving the region.
Workers can be mobile between or within regions. Our analysis suggests that increasing
the mobility of workers between regions or within regions (by decreasing the urban costs) is
likely to result into greater regional disparity. In contrast, increasing a worker’s mobility in the
labor market and allowing him to move more easily between jobs is shown to be beneﬁcial to
reducing spatial disparities.
5.3 Education
The European Commission’s Report on Economic and Social Cohesion stresses in its recommen-
dation the beneﬁt of education and training on the development of regions and the reduction
of regional disparities: “the Union must support the factors that play a decisive role (...) to
reduce the profound imbalances aﬀecting its territory. In short, supporting investment in (...)
human capital must remain the key objective” (European Commission, 2001). Nevertheless
such a point is controversial since a large literature on brain drain emphasizes that because of
local spillovers, well-educated workers have incentives to locate in the same place and thereby
leave their native region (Miyagiwa, 1991). Our model departs from this literature in two ways:
ﬁrst, the workers’ agglomeration force is not based on a local pure externality and, second, hu-
man capital has not only an ad hoc positive impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Indeed, as stressed in
section 2.2, the level of human capital denoted by h has a direct impact on the productivity h
as well as an indirect impact on the level of mismatch through the term s(h) : unlike speciﬁc
training, general training13 improves the workers’ mobility on the labor market and reduces
the magnitude of mismatch. Therefore the model provides new insight on the impact of human
capital formation and training on both workers and ﬁrms location choices.
12For a proof, see Appendix 7.6 Point IS.
13With speciﬁc (general) training, we mean any type of education or training that increases (decreases) a
worker’s specialisation. An example of speciﬁc training are certain types of vocational training schools which
focus on a single sector or occupation.
24In a ﬁrst step, we look at the impact of human capital on the size eﬀect when the speed of
ﬁrms is inﬁnite. In this case, the size eﬀect is only measured through a change in the population.
In a second step, we shall look at the more general case where the speed of adjustment is not
inﬁnite.
When there is no ﬁrm inertia the impact of human capital on spatial disparity is established
by looking at the eﬀect of h on ¯ α. The level of human capital has an impact on wages as well
as on proﬁts. The eﬀect of h o nt h ew a g ed i ﬀerence, that is on the location decision of the















If region A i st h el a r g e rr e g i o nb o t hi nt e r m so fp o p u l a t i o na n di nt e r m so ft h en u m b e ro fﬁrms,
we have that
1





































As the level of human capital increases, workers are more or less likely to move to the region
where ﬁrms are agglomerated (here region A) depending on whether they are more or less
mobile on the labor market following an increase in h. In other terms, the result states that
general training reduces the incentives of workers to agglomerate.
Such an impact is the result of a “competition eﬀect”: higher human capital results in a
change in the mobility of workers in the technology space. If there is a matching improvement,
the increased competition on local labor markets leads to less spatial mobility. Indeed, the
agglomeration of workers arises from imperfect matching with ﬁrms. Such imperfect matching
gives bargaining power to ﬁrms. As a result, workers are likely to locate where competition
between ﬁrms on the labor market is tough. In other words, the magnitude of the agglomeration
force depends on the degree of matching imperfection. An increase in the level of human capital
changes the degree in matching, thus changing the oligopsonic power of ﬁrms and thereby
leading to a change in the bassin of attraction.













=0 ( 1 8 )
This implies that with this speciﬁcation, an increase in the level of human capital has no impact
on ﬁrms’ locations. Indeed, because of constant returns to scale, all eﬀects on the diﬀerence
in proﬁts come from the monopsonic power term (slj/Nβj). At the equilibrium I,b o t ht e r m s






















Hence, if a higher level of human capital increases (decreases) workers’ mobility on the labor
market, this increase leads to an increase (decrease) of the critical threshold in terms of size
above which the economy converges towards complete agglomeration and experiences higher
spatial disparity.
Assume that an increase in the level of human capital leads to greater mobility of the
workers on the labor market. Consider an initial level of human capital h0. Whenever the
density of workers in region A is higher than ¯ α(h0), the number of ﬁrms located in A is high
enough to attract new workers and so on. Suppose the level of human capital increases to a level
h1 (>h 0). If the density remains in the neighborhood of ¯ α(h0), for that new level of human
capital, workers are no longer induced to locate in region A despite the fact that a lot of ﬁrms are
induced to do so. In other words, the economy no longer converges towards the agglomerated
equilibrium, but instead moves towards the symmetrical outcome. As shown by the welfare
analysis of section 5.1, this means that such a policy is able to promote regional equity and
global eﬃciency. Our framework also allows us to say something about the desirability of
general training versus speciﬁc training. From a perspective of reducing regional disparities
and improve eﬃciency, our model shows that general training is to be preferred to speciﬁc
training.
The second case to be considered is the case where ﬁrms do not relocate instantaneously.
Extrapolating the linearization around point I, we know that there is an unstable arm which
goes through point I.14 Above the unstable arm, the economy agglomerates completely. Under
14Here again the analysis is the same for point I0.
26the unstable arm, the economy moves towards the symmetrical equilibrium. Since we have
shown that an increase in h moves point I towards the north-east (respectively south-west) in
the case of general training (respectively speciﬁc training), we can infer that the probability of
ending up in a situation of spatial inequality is reduced.15
Few economic geography papers introduce human capital. Nevertheless, our result devel-
oped in this section is in line with Martin (1999) in a diﬀerent context. He stresses that an
increase in the researchers’ productivity reduces regional inequality by inducing more entry on
the good market. Such results are in sharp contrast with standard models of the “brain drain”
in which human capital improvement is likely to support emigration of skilled workers to the
most developed region. Indeed, in a model ` a la Miyagiwa (1991), because of positive human ex-
ternality, the most educated workers are those who have the highest incentives to move toward
the most developed region. Therefore, an increase in the level of human capital can magnify
the agglomeration force. The main diﬀerence with this literature lies in the agglomeration force
that leads the economy toward spatial polarization. In our framework, the positive impact of
workers located in a region arises from an indirect mechanism: workers attract ﬁrms which
in turn attract workers; whereas in the “brain drain” literature, the local positive externality
needed for the agglomeration eﬀect is exogenous and linked to a peer eﬀect. Therefore, an
increase in human capital magniﬁes this peer eﬀect while, in our framework, such an increase
can make workers less sensitive to labor market competition. Note that whenever an increase
in human capital increases the specialization of workers, the model leads to the same result as
the “brain drain” literature since workers are then more induced to move toward the region
where ﬁrms are agglomerated.
We can summarize the impact of these two mobility policies in the following way: any
improvement of spatial mobility is likely to increase regional disparities whereas improved
mobility between skill requirements is likely to reduce such disparities.
15This point can be illustrated with experiences of countries like the Czech Republic and Poland. The
existence of education structures leading to a workforce which was too specialised was seen as a major barrier
to their development. Recently, these countries have tried to make vocational programs more general (Gill et
al. 2000). Similarly, Campbell et al. (1989) attribute the economic problems of the UK in the 80s to the same
reasons.
275.4 Competition policy
Competition policy can either accommodate or deter entry. Since proﬁts and wages depend
on the number of ﬁrms, such a public intervention has an impact on spatial outcome. Not
surprisingly, an increase in the number of ﬁrms has the same qualitative eﬀect on the spatial
equilibrium as an education policy which makes the workers more mobile on the labor market.
Indeed, eventually, both policies tend to increase competition on the labor market.














=0 ( 1 9 )
Since competition increases in the small region as well, workers have less incentives to move
toward the large region where they suﬀer from high urban costs. More formally, an increase in





















Hence, a higher level of entry of ﬁrms increases the critical size threshold above which the
economy converges towards complete agglomeration and experiences higher spatial disparity.
Therefore, an increase in the number of ﬁrms pushes the economy toward spatial dispersion.
In other words, we show that entry plays as a dispersion force. In this model, we have a
ﬁxed number of ﬁrms. Nevertheless, the former result suggests that free entry would push the
economy toward the symmetric equilibrium.
As the previous policy, competition policy inﬂuences the degree of regional disparity by
modifying competition on the labor market. Since oligopsony power on the labor market
aﬀects wages and thereby leads workers to migrate where ﬁrms are agglomerated, any pro-
competitive policy, whether it promotes ﬁrm entry or improves workers’ mobility between task
through education or training, makes complete agglomeration less likely.
286 Conclusion
We show in this paper that labor market imperfection due to speciﬁc human capital can give
rise to increasing regional disparities. Indeed, workers, in order to avoid ﬁrms’ monopsony
power, have incentives to move to the region where ﬁrms are located and ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o m
locating in regions with large labor markets.
In this framework, we show how certain public policies can inﬂuence the spatial distri-
bution of economic activity. Any policy that increases the mobility of workers between tasks,
increases competition on the labor market. As a result, workers are less likely to move from the
less populated region to the most populated region. Stated diﬀerently, such an improvement
undermines size eﬀects and can therefore bring away the economy from regional disparities.
Our analysis suggests that not all types of education policies favor regional equality: only the
education policies which increases the workers’ mobility on the labor market will decrease the
probability of having regional disparity.
Finally, the presence of immobile workers can modify the regional outcome. First, obviously,
immobile workers prohibit full agglomeration of either region. More importantly, when the
s h a r eo fi m m o b i l ew o r k e r si ss u ﬃciently important, an economy which, without immobile
workers would be spatially polarized, could with their presence, on the contrary, converge
towards the symmetrical equilibrium. The reason is that the presence of immobile workers
prevents the economy to reach a critical size threshold that would allow the polarization of the
regions.
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327A p p e n d i x
7.1 Labour supply
Formally we have for the workers who are indiﬀerent between working in ﬁrm i − 1a n di (ˆ x)













This means that the supply of labor to ﬁrm i in region j consists of all workers between ˆ x
and b y and is given by αj(b y − ˆ x).
7.2 Urban cost
Without loss of generality, the opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero. The workers of
region j are equally distributed around the CBD. In equilibrium, since all workers choosing
to reside in region j expect to earn the same wage, they have the same expected utility level.
Furthermore, since they all consume one unit of land, the equilibrium land rent at distance
x<αj/2f r o mt h eC B Di nj is given by
R∗(x)=t(αj/2 − x)
This means that a worker located at the average distance αj/4 from the CBD bears a com-
muting cost equal to tαj/4 and pays the average land rent tαj/4. We assume that all the land
rents are collected and equally redistributed among the workers of the region. Consequently,
the individual urban costs after redistribution of the land rents are equal to tαj/4.
7.3 Convexity of function M(αA)










































































































































































laΦ + lbΨ >l bΦ + lbΨ
which is true since
la >l b
347.4 Concavity of function G(αA)
Showing the concavity of G(αA) for a general production function proves to be rather compli-
cated. It is possible to ﬁnd numerical examples to show this property. In addition, we are able










At point I,w ek n o wt h a t
∆w =0⇔
θh2 (NβA − αAN)+
5
4
s(2NβA − N) − (N − NβA)NβA (2αA − 1)t =0
Moreover, using the Implicit Function Theorem, we obtain the following result
G0(αA)
=
θh2N +2( N − NβA)NβAt
θh2 + 5






[2NG0 (N − 2NβA)t]D − K [2NG0 (2αA − 1)t +2 t(2NβA − N)]
D2 < 0
7.5 Existence of equilibria (point I)
The behavior between the two curves can be analyzed by looking at the diﬀerence of the two
curves:
P(αA)=G(αA) − M(αA)
This expression is symmetrical with respect to αA = 1
2:
P(αA)=−P(1− αA)





35In the quadratic case, P is concave. Thus if I exists and it is unique.
Let us consider the general case.

































As far as F0(0) is ﬁn i t e ,w eh a v ea l w a y sG(1) <Nand thus P(αA =1 )< 0. In other words,
at αA =1 /2, P takes the value zero. At αA =1 ,P has a negative value. If F0(0) is inﬁnite,
P(αA =1 )> 0.
The question is whether at αA =1 /2, P increases before decreasing. If it does, it intersects
the X-axis To check this, we have
P0(αA =1 /2) = G0(αA =1 /2) − M0(αA =1 /2)
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to ∆w for function G, we arrive at the following
result:








For function M, the following result is easily computed:

































In other words, (i) when F0(0) is ﬁnite at least a point I exists if t <tand (ii) when F0(0) is
inﬁnite, at least a point I exists if t>t .
36Assume that there is only one point I corrsesponding to the case previous case (i). We




) > 0a n dP(αA =1 )< 0
we have
P0(¯ α) < 0
which implies that
G0(¯ α) <M 0(¯ α)
7.6 Equilibria stability
We assume here that there is only one point I.
We introduce equations of motion for both variables:
˙ αA =

   
   
ϕMax(∆w(αA,βA),0) if αA = αL
A
ϕ∆w(αA,βA)i fαL
A < αA < αH
A






   
   
γMax(∆π(αA,βA),0) if βA =0
γ∆π(αA,βA)i f0 < βA < 1
γMin(∆π(αA,βA),0) if βA =1
(23)
with ϕ,γ > 0. These equations of motion show that when the variables are between their
respective boundaries then the movement has the same sign as the diﬀerence in either wages
or proﬁts. These equations also show us that when a variable reaches one of the threshold, the




To check for the stability of the diﬀerent equilibria, we look at the Jacobian matrix of
the system of equations given by (22) and (23) as far as both functions are continuous i. e.
everywhere except at the diﬀerent treshold where we use a graphical argument. For a stable
equilibrium, it is suﬃcient to show that the determinant is positive while the trace is negative.
For a saddle point, it is suﬃcient to show that the determinant is negative.






















































Two possible equilibria have to be looked at: S (symmetrical), I (intermediate). We have the
additional information that ∂∆w
∂αA < 0a n d∂∆π
∂αA < 0.































We know that the expression outside the brackets is always positive and the terms within the
brackets can be rewritten.
38For any point located on the demarcation lines, we know that
g(αA,βA)=0
m(αA,βA)=0









= G0 (αA)/M 0 (αA)
This leads us to
(G0/M 0 − 1)
We know that at point S we have G0 >M 0 which means that the determinant is positive.
Point I In the case of I, we can apply the same logic as for point S, which means that
the sign of the determinant is given by the sign of
(G0/M 0 − 1)
At point I, we know that G0 <M 0 which means that the determinant is negative and that we
have a saddle point.
Points F, IS and IF Points are stable according to a graphical argument based on the
phase diagram of ﬁgures 6 and 7. Note that an analytical result is hard to derive because of
the non continuity of the dynamic around these points.
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